advanced steadily to within striking distance of the batteries, and then rushed upon them with the bayonet. After a short but bloody contest he captured them—an event, we may say, decisive of the battle; for although the enemy made repeated attempts to recover their guns and their position, they were as often driven back by the unflinching steadiness of our men. It was past eleven o'clock, however, before they finally, with no very good grace, gave up the contest and abandoned the field to us. In driving back one of the last of these obstinate and bloody charges, Scott received a very severe musket-shot wound, which shattered all the bones of his left shoulder, and still greatly disables that arm: Gen. Brown, also, was badly wounded about the same time; and both Generals had to be borne from the field, with hurts that left it doubtful if either would ever be able to serve again. We have only to add, in regard to the fight of Chippewa, that if modern times can show us battles on a greater scale or more decisive in their consequences than this Lundy's Lane or Bridgewater, they can present none more skilfully or bloodily contested; for again (as at Chippewa) the loss among all those engaged may be fairly stated as probably one in every four, killed, wounded, or taken.

SCOTT'S SLOW RECOVERY FROM HIS WOUNDS—PROMOTION.

For a month after the battle of Niagara Scott lay between life and death, first at Buffalo, then at Williamsville, and nextly at Batavia, in the house of Mr. Brisbane, under the gentle care of whose family he at last recovered just enough to bear the being carried in a litter on men's shoulders. In this manner he was slowly and laboriously borne along from town to town, in search of medical relief, upon the voluntary shoulders of those who loved him for his exploits, until at last they brought him to the house of his friend, John Nicholas, at Geneva. Thence, after recovering a little further under the nursing of that household, he slowly made his way towards Philadelphia, that he might obtain the aid of the celebrated Drs. Physick, Chapman, and Gibson. Every where as he passed he was greeted by all the public honors and private attentions he could bear. Princeton, in particular, met the suffering hero with the literary compliment of an academic reception and a diploma, made more grateful to the soldier by the revolutionary memories of that scene of battles. At Philadelphia Gov. Snyder and the citizens welcomed him with military and civic parades. Thence he proceeded to Baltimore, to direct measures for the defence of which and of Philadelphia against an expected British attack he had, disabled as he was, received a request from the Government and the Congressional representatives of Pennsylvania and Maryland. Arriving in Washington in October, he was, being now again fit for duty, placed in command of that military district, and employed to plan the expected campaigns of the next spring, in which, of course, he would have had a leading part, and have won new laurels, if peace had not been meantime concluded at Ghent, on the 24th of December, 1814, and ratified by our Senate on the 15th of February, 1815. After this event, there being no further need for him in the field, Mr. Madison offered him the post of Secretary at War; but he declined it, considering himself too young, for he was yet only twenty-eight. Meanwhile, he had been brevetted for the battles of Chippewa and Niagara to the highest existing rank in our service—that of Major General. It is known that at every previous step of his rapid promotion President Madison, though knowing him well and persuaded of his extraordinary military merits, had always objected that, although he deserved it, he was too young. He had thus thought that Scott was made lieutenant colonel too young, adjutant general too young, colonel of a double regiment too young, and brigadier general quite too young. But when, after his late heroic battles, it was proposed to him by his Cabinet to advance the youth to our highest military grade, he laughingly answered, "Put him down a major general; I have done with objecting to his youth." Two years before he had looked on him as only old enough to be a major; now he thought him ripe enough to be Secretary at War! When, as we have said, Scott declined that dignity, he endeavored to induce him at least to become acting Secretary—keeping his army rank, of course—until Wm. H. Crawford, then in France, could return to take the post; but this also Scott respectfully declined, out of delicacy towards his seniors in date, Gens. Brown and Jackson.

IS SENT TO EUROPE: MISSION PARTLY MILITARY, PARTLY POLITICAL.

The enfeebled state of his health and the desire of professional improvement suggesting to him a trip to Europe, the Government now gave him a double commission abroad: first, to look into the improvements of military science there; and next to conduct certain secret negotiations as to the views of foreign courts in regard to the Independence of Spanish America and the supposed designs of Britain upon the island of Cuba. Of these latter objects he acquitted himself much to the satisfaction of our Executive. To accomplish the former, he examined the chief military establishments of Western Europe, conversed with its most eminent soldiers, and attended the scientific lectures of the schools of Tactics; bringing home with him, in 1816, whatever could improve our own and fit him for drawing up those systems of discipline and instruction for our Army and Militia to which we have since owed our Mexican victories. On his return he was placed in command of the military division of the seaboard, with New York for his headquarters. In 1817, he married Miss Mayo, of Richmond.

THANKS VOTED HIM: SWORDS, MEDAL: CONDUCT OF ROBBERS.

Meantime, Virginia and New York had presented him votes of thanks and rich swords, "for his uniform good conduct in sustaining the military reputation of the United States, in every conflict where he was present during the late war with England, but more especially in the successive engagements of Chippewa and Niagara." Congress also voted him, in the same high terms, (conferred by it on no other,) a large gold medal, inscribed with the names of Chippewa and Niagara, and bearing his image upon it. With this medal two singular incidents are connected. It was placed for safe keeping in the vault of the City Bank of New York. A noted robber, afterwards detected and punished, breaking into the safe, carried off from thence every thing else valuable, but spared, in evident respect for the brave soldier's only wealth, this token of public honor—his medal. Its case was found lying there open, but with its large mass of pure gold safe. Not even a whole life of crime had been able to extinguish in that poor felon a lingering feeling of patriotism, of pride in his country's best soldier. Alas! if ever the general admiration of his country should bring that soldier forward as its nominee for the Presidency, it is but too easy to foresee that there will be men, called not theives, but politicians, who will do their best to rifle him of all his hard-won fame, which the robber respected! But again: long afterwards, in travelling by steamboat from Albany down to New York, Gen. Scott had his pocket picked of a purse containing some eight hundred dollars in gold. On arriving he advertised his loss. His money was sent back to him by the head thief of the city, with a respectful assurance that none of his people would have touched the General's purse if they had known his person.

QUARREL WITH GEN. JACKSON: THEIR RECONCILIATION.

In 1817 there occurred a very unnecessary difficulty between Gens. Scott and Jackson. The latter had issued a general order grossly insubordinate towards the War Department. At a dinner party in New York Gov. Clinton asked Gen. Scott's opinion of it. He answered that it was mutinous in its tendency, and gave his reasons for that view. The conversation was conveyed to Gen. Jackson by some anonymous tale-bearer. The General, always ready to fight any body who ventured to disapprove one of his violent acts, wrote to Gen. Scott from Nashville, requesting to know if his anonymous correspondent reported the truth? Gen. Scott replied by telling how far, and the circumstances; disavowing any ill will towards him as influencing his opinion. Gen. Jackson rejoined quite angrily, and with an offer of personal satisfaction. To this, in his answer, Gen. Scott, who thought Gen. Jackson had no right to be offended, and who (besides that he had no need to give proof of his having courage enough to meet Gen. Jackson or any body) had no taste for shedding blood any where but on the battle-field, paid no attention. And so for the time the affair dropped. In 1823, however, they were both in Washington at once; and it being currently reported that Gen. Jackson meant to insult him whenever they met, Gen. Scott sent him a note referring to their falling out, to the fact of their being now for the first time within reach of each other, and to the possibility that Gen. Jackson did not know of it, nor that he would yet remain in Washington for three days. To this note Gen. Jackson returned a conciliatory answer; they made friends, and ever after remained upon terms of all courtesy and respect.

PREPARES OUR SYSTEMS OF TACTICS: GOES ABROAD AGAIN.

We owe to Gen. Scott almost all we have of a military system. That which we use was (as has been seen) first introduced by him at Buffalo. There he with it in three months converted Gen. Brown's division into men that could not afterwards be beat. He had then only personally taught it: but in 1814-15 it was regularly adopted for all our army, by a board of officers, of which he was President. In 1821 he published it in 8vo., under title of "*General Regulations for the Army.*" In 1825 he published his "*Infantry Tactics.*" In 1826 he drew up for the War Department "*A plan for the organization and instruction of the whole body of the Militia of the Union,*" and "*A System of Infantry and Rifle Tactics.*" In 1835 he published, by order of Congress, a new edition of the latter. How well his system works has been seen in Mexico, through the armies formed under it. Certainly, we owe much to West Point and its scientific instruction; but West Point owes no little of what it is to Gen. Scott. It is he, in reality, who has given to our army that admirable spirit, that high gentlemanliness, that character, that extreme efficiency, that respect for law and that love of duty, which distinguish it even more than its science, and make it the finest body of men in the world. It appears, too, singularly enough, that he may be placed among the earliest pioneers of the Temperance Reform. For he published in 1821 a long tract (12 columns) in Walsh's *National Gazette* of Philadelphia, proposing a plan for restricting the use of ardent spirits in the United States. He was led to this idea by the mischiefs from intemperance with which he had to contend in governing the army. In 1829 he again visited Europe, for professional information.

THE BLACK HAWK WAR: THE CHOLERA: SCOTT'S CONDUCT.

The interesting events which are contained in the life of Gen. Scott crowd upon us. We must therefore pass very slightly over some of them which would show very bright in the history of others. Such a case is that of his conduct in the Black Hawk war of 1832; where he not only quieted most humanely and prudently great difficulties with Indian tribes, but concluded treaties of great benefit to our people of the Northwest; and, more than all, endeared himself to every true heart by the manner in which, when the Asiatic cholera broke out among his soldiers with most fatal violence, he nursed and tended them, in total disregard of his own safety, although himself affected all the while by symptoms of the disease. So terrible was the mortality which of a sudden fell upon his men that out of 950 there were, in a few days, but about 400 left. The rest had perished aboard the steamers which were conveying them, or, when landed at Chicago, had fled from the pestilence-stroke; but, overtaken by it in their flight, and every where denied shelter and aid by the terrified inhabitants, had only died, for the most part, still more miserably. Scott's own boat, small and crowded, became a perfect pest-house; out of 220 men aboard, 52 died in the passage, and 80 had to be placed in the hospital when they reached Chicago! The deck and hold were covered with the dead and dying. Amidst this terrible scene, instead of contenting himself (as most men in command would have done) with merely ordering the medical men to take all necessary measures for relieving the sick, Scott became in person their attendant, and performed for his humblest comrade, with a brother's care, every dangerous office from which others shrank. Much as he has shown himself the hero upon battle-fields, he never any where displayed a more genuine heroism, one more pure, noble, and affecting, than upon this occasion. Such has been his conduct towards his fellow-soldiers in all times of suffering. Here, while their messmates fled from them, many of their officers neglected them, and their panic-stricken fellow-citizens shut their doors and hearts against them, the great Commander, as good as he was brave, stood by them as true at the death-bed as in battle.

SCOTT SENT TO QUIET THE NULLIFIERS: DOES IT.

He had hardly got home from these trying scenes when a fresh order of the Government sent him to another. At the close of 1832 (November) Nullification was coming to a head. A South Carolina Convention had passed its ordinance declaring that the United States revenue laws should not be enforced in that State; and its Legislature and Executive were (while insisting that Nullification was the most peaceful of remedies) making all preparations for armed resistance. Indeed, the whole population had, by four years of incessant agitation, been worked up into little short of a public phrenzy. Two-thirds of them had learnt to believe themselves the most oppressed people upon earth; they were ready to go to any extremity; and the readier, because they had in a very bitter opposition-party at home an object of immediate hate, on whom they longed to wreak a double vengeance, for not only the sins of the Federal Government, which that party supported, but for its own. In short, these adverse factions, about equally fanatical, were at a point of mutual exasperation where a collision could hardly be hindered, and where that collision could scarcely fail to become the signal of a civil war. The Union (or Government) party regarded its opponents as traitors to the confederacy; its opponents looked on them as traitors to their State. Both were keen to come to blows; the former, though the weaker, because they were denounced and proscribed by the others, and relied upon the strong federal arm for crushing them as soon as it came to arms; the latter, because they knew this feeling, and were doubly furious against those who, though Carolinians, were anxious to have their own State dragooned. Such was the condition of things amidst which Gen. Scott was sent among them. At first, to ascertain exactly what measures were needed, and yet to avoid adding to their excitement by open steps of military precaution, he went down in November to Columbia, Augusta, Savannah, and Charleston, as if on his ordinary yearly visit of inspecting the United States' troops and fortresses. When he had thus quietly looked into every thing, he returned to Washington, made his report to President Jackson, concerted with the Government all that was to be done, sent forward to Charleston the revenue cutters and troops that were needful, and then repaired thither himself, with confidential instructions. These we cannot recite further than that he was to keep on the defensive as far as possible, and to rely on the legal means of enforcing the law, until they failed. But a large discretion was, of course, left him; for every thing depended on judgment. Without that, all the instructions in the world would not have been worth a button. Happily for the country, and not less happily for South Carolina, the right man had been chosen for this difficult service, and chosen because the Government knew him to be just the man, not because it loved him. He conducted the whole business to its end, with such steadiness and skill, with such a happy mixture of conciliation and firmness, of secrecy and of timely words, that he controlled the violence of both parties, induced the leaders and setters-on of the matter themselves to hearken to his patriotic counsels, and finally disarmed those flaming animosities and that insane wish to see bloodshed, which had, when he arrived in Charleston, filled all men's minds, and armed their hands against each other. Nothing could be more dangerous than the men, the temper, and the situation of things with which he had to deal; nothing more delicate and yet firm than the management required. A single false step would probably have been fatal and lighted up a civil war, which would have spread through the whole South and sundered the Union. We owe (under God) our escape from these terrible evils only to the exertions and the wisdom of Gen. Scott; who abundantly proved to all those who were actors in the matter (among whom the writer hereof was one) that his abilities are quite as equal to dangerous and difficult civil conjunctures as to the handling of armies in the field.

FLORIDA WAR: PUBLIC DISAPPOINTMENT AND INJUSTICE.

Of the Florida war, and Gen. Scott's brief part in it, we need say little. It is not agreeable to dwell upon operations which the habits of the foe and the nature of the country where he was to be hunted up made and still continue to make invariable failures. The public, with a levity and an injustice of which it has now been long aware, condemned Gen. Scott because, sent off to Florida suddenly and without preparation, he did not finish in a month a war which afterwards cost years of exertion and ten millions of money, and is hardly ended yet. He lost no battle, suffered no check; but no matter—he did not at once subdue an enemy whom he could not find; and all his merits, all his services, were forgotten. Nobody knew the impracticable country in which he was to act, nor that it was a warfare of guess and experiment, in which he was obliged to begin by groping in the dark for the best mode of operating. He was laughed at by the public, and recalled by the Administration. But he demanded an inquiry, and the able court before which the matter was tried came to the clearest opinion that he had committed no fault, and that his plans were all well laid, and executed with all zeal and ability. These transactions were in 1836.

HE QUELLS THE TROUBLES OF THE CANADIAN FRONTIER.

This country of ours is always easy to persuade that it has lost or is on the point of losing its own liberty; but though thus confessedly hard put to it to take care of its own freedom, it has a great passion for making itself the guardian of every body else's. This prudent disposition has more than once threatened to get us into great trouble, sometimes with other nations, sometimes among ourselves. In 1837 it was near plunging us into a war with Great Britain. At that time an insurrection was attempted in Canada. Its object was the independence of that country. But far the greater part of the population preferred remaining under the British Government, and the revolt was at once crushed, rather by the Canadian militia than the Government troops. This should have been enough to satisfy any well-wisher to the so-called Canadian cause; for surely, if Canada had no mind to set up for freedom, she had a right to please herself, and it was nobody's business but hers. So, however, seem not to have thought many of our people.

All along our border, from Vermont to Michigan, a sort of army, a wide and very numerous organization of self-styled "Sympathizers," had spread itself. A few of them, when the outbreak occurred, had crossed, joined in it, fallen into the hands of the British authorities, and been punished. This only made the rest more violent; and the scene of Canadian Revolution, broken up there, was transferred to our side. Forgetting all treaties and all sense, one-fourth of our population along there seem to have made up their mind that what Canada would not have—independence—we, her neighbors, would make her have, any how. To add to the flame, the English violated our territory, by seizing upon a steamer, the Caroline, that was employed in carrying over "sympathizers" to Navy Island, where they were collecting forces for a fresh invasion. She was taken, destroyed, and an American on board of her killed. This outrage produced a great excitement all over the United States: for our people, though not at all scrupulous of violating the territory of others, are extremely jealous of their own. So strong was the public feeling that there seemed nothing more likely than that large bodies of our folks, instigated and led by the many refugees from Canada who were among them, would fling themselves, at many points, upon the British territory, and that a war between the two Governments would necessarily ensue. To prevent this, President Van Buren again put in requisition the abilities of Gen. Scott as a peace-maker. On the 4th January, 1838, he was sent off to the frontier, with ample powers, both political and military, on the one side to suppress the illegal movements of our "sympathizers," and on the other to check any British violation of our soil. It was necessary to meet those armed assemblages of misguided men, as fast as they collected, all along a frontier of eight hundred miles, and, by the joint force of reason and of firm authority, to get the better of their passions and of the influence of their leaders. He had no sooner done this at one point than he was obliged often to hurry off to another, perhaps far away, for the same purpose. This was much of it done by the most rapid journeys, through all the rigors of a Northern winter, and by night: for in the day he acted, and travelled by night. Such was his speed to move and his vigilance to watch, that if a body of these people assembled any where, no matter how far off, before they could move forward to act, he was sure to be in the midst of them, arguing, warning, conjuring them, or, if all else failed, assuring them that they should not march except over his dead body. While he dealt thus with our own people, he negotiated as actively and as effectually with John Bull's men, to prevent any provocation and to produce reasonableness on their side. This severe and difficult duty occupied him, at various intervals as the troubles burst out afresh or were appeased, all through the year 1838 and part of 1839. When not engaged in them, he was as busily employed on two other important public services, as follows.

HIS REMOVAL OF THE CHEROKEES FROM GEORGIA.

Although the successful management of this painful but necessary business did equal honor to the judgment and the humanity of Scott, yet we have not space for its details. The United States had in 1802 bound themselves to Georgia to extinguish the Indian title to lands within her limits. Before Georgia positively claimed the performance of that engagement, these Indians (Cherokees) had quitted their savage mode of life, become christians and tillers of the earth, and quite civilized. Of course they had ceased to hold their lands in common; they had become individual proprietors. Having improved their lands and made to themselves homes, they had naturally grown attached to them. They claimed, however, to live under the protection of the General Government and to be exempt from the State jurisdiction of Georgia, while the latter asserted the contrary. Hence a long quarrel and much mutual hostility arose. Finally things came to such a height that it was evident they would not live together in any peace, and that the Cherokees must be removed. A part of them yielded and went to the new seats assigned them beyond the Mississippi, but the body of the nation (some 15,000) utterly refused, declaring that they had made up their minds rather to perish, every soul of them, than to leave the homesteads that had now grown so dear to them. Reluctant as they were, the office of tearing a whole people from their hearthstones would have been a most unwelcome one to any man with a heart, even had they been submissive; but they were warlike, and the despair of a brave race, abundantly armed, skilful, and possessing in their country mountain and forest fastnesses, was too likely to make it a business at once bloody and inglorious. Scott, ever the man resorted to when things are difficult or disagreeable, was again the person pitched upon by President Van Buren for this sad service. He executed it, however, so humanely as well as efficiently as to take away the chief part of what threatened to make it melancholy. Arriving among them with several regiments of troops, he began by securing all their strongholds. He next issued an address to his men, enjoining the greatest kindness and care towards man, woman, and child, and denouncing severe punishment for all ill usage of any Indian. At the same time he published an address to the nation so full of reason and affection, that they, little accustomed to be dealt with in so good and brotherly a manner, were completely won from all their stubborn purposes, came cheerfully into his measures, and were, under his careful and beneficent arrangements, transported to their new abiding places.

HE PREVENTS A WAR ABOUT THE DISPUTED TERRITORY IN MAINE.

Just after this came his other service of peace, in settling the quarrel between Maine and the British authorities of New Brunswick; a quarrel which was on the point of coming to blows, that a bloody national conflict would have been sure to follow. The difficulty sprang out of the uncertain terms by which our original treaty of peace with Great Britain (that of 1783) had described the limits that were to divide us from the British province. Repeated conferences of ambassadors and commissioners had attempted to settle how the line should be drawn, according to the treaty; but they had all failed. In this manner a thing which would at first have been easy to adjust became at last very hard to adjust. For the strip of disputed territory, small and barren, which originally lay in the heart of a dreary wilderness, remote from any settlements on either side, came gradually to be approached from both sides by the spread of population; nay, to have within it, at several points, small settlements, a part of them made by Americans and a part by British. Each of these claimed, of course, to belong to the country from which the settlers came, and looked on the settlers from the other side as intruders. So, too, the respective local authorities: both Maine and New Brunswick held the jurisdiction to be theirs. Both sold the timber on it; for the soil was worthless, the timber alone of any value, and the business of "lumbering" the only pursuit which led people thither. It was, in short, a quarrel not about the land but the timber on it. But this was all the worse; for, as to the soil, they could have waited for negotiation between the two superior Governments to settle the right: nobody could carry off the soil: but not so the timber; that, the lumbermen on either side would have been sure to run away with before any negotiators would agree about the true boundary. Well, the result of all this had been a violent quarrel between Maine and New Brunswick. Both had sold to their people rights to cut timber; both considered themselves bound to uphold their own jurisdiction and the rights they had conveyed to their citizens. First their lumbermen fell out; then their magistrates; and finally their governors and legislators. At first it was a war of writs and arrests; but presently there was resistance, and the *posses* had to be called out. Posse, however, met posse, arrest met arrest; until, at length Maine called out her militia, and the Governor of New Brunswick marched his troops; while our Congress, taking up the note of war, placed at the disposal of the President ten millions of dollars and fifty thousand troops. War seemed almost certain: a blow had only to be struck; and both Maine and New Brunswick stood ready to strike it. It was in this very threatening state of things that Gen. Scott was sent thither. The Government had already interfered and concluded a pacificatory arrangement with Mr. Fox, then the British ambassador here: but it stipulated for the withdrawal of the troops of Maine, without exacting the same of New Brunswick; and the consequence was that this clumsy attempt aggravated the difficulty it was meant to settle. Scott hastened to Augusta, and opened there at once negotiations with both the authorities of Maine and with Gen. Sir John Harvey, the Governor of New Brunswick, his warm personal friend ever since the Canadian war, when they had often met in battle, often seen each other's gallant acts, often joined in those deeds of humanity or courtesy towards a foe which soften the ferocity of war and give it a grace even beyond that of bravery. By an act of this sort, in truth, Scott had saved Harvey's life. He had unbounded confidence in Gen. Scott; and, very soon coming into his elevated views, consented to make the concession to Maine of withdrawing his troops. Maine alone, then, remained to be brought to reason. This Scott now soon effected; and thus, by his prudence and humanity, for the fourth time deserved that noble title of the Peace-maker, which great warriors have seldom been good enough men to earn.

PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS OF 1840 AND 1844: POLITICS.

Between the Maine affair and the Mexican war Gen. Scott had nothing to perform beyond his ordinary military duties, except so far as some important public conjunctures called him to the duty of taking some action or expressing some opinion on matters of high national concern. In 1840, when the delegations from New York and four other States were about to bring his name forward in the Harrisburg Convention as the Whig nominee for the Presidency, he wrote a letter declaring that he thought the nomination was due, first of all, to the public merits of Mr. Clay; next, if he could not be elected, to Gen. Harrison; and, lastly, that it should only be given to himself if the chances of success seemed desperate, and a "forlorn hope" was to be led. Six copies of this letter were placed in the hands of as many members of the Convention, and there made known. Again, in the nomination of 1844, he signified, by a published letter, his preference for Mr. Clay rather than himself. In the same year he made known by a circular, in answer to inquiries addressed to him from many quarters, his opinions as to all the main questions on party politics. They showed him to be eminently a Whig and a Conservative. He had previously, in a letter to T. P. Atkinson, of Danville, Virginia, avowed all his views on the subject of slavery. We need only say that they are precisely those of Watkins Leigh. They amount to this: that he dislikes slavery, like Mr. Jefferson, and would like to see it abolished, but cautiously, slowly, and only by State legislation; for he holds Congress to have no power over the subject, except in the District of Columbia, where in good faith they ought not to exercise it. The measures of the Abolitionists he considers mistaken ones, that would bring great calamities upon both whites and blacks. He looks on the fanaticism which has been kindled up, and all agitation, as only injurious to the public good and to the cause of emancipation. These are the opinions of a wise man, a patriot, and a true friend of freedom. They may displease the fanatical in the North, or the equally fanatical in the South; but his opinions were not put on to please either. And here we may just as well add that he stands in the same position as to the Compromise of 1850: he was and is its friend; every body knows it; and he has never sought to conceal it from any one.

NATIVE AMERICANISM.

We mean not to hide any thing in the history of Gen. Scott. We write of him admiringly, but we shall write of him frankly. In 1845 the pretended Democracy, by representing the Whigs as the enemies of all foreign-born citizens, deceived the great body of these and secured their vote. It was thought to have defeated Mr. Clay's election. Besides that, the conduct of the "Empire Club" in New York, the bloody riots in Philadelphia, the Plaquemines frauds, and other like events, alarmed many good and sober citizens, and seemed to threaten that a comparatively small number of deluded men were going to govern us. Under the excitement of these circumstances, Gen. Scott, like many others, thought our birthright was going to be taken from us, and declared himself in favor of lengthening the term now required for the admission of a foreigner to the rights of a citizen. In the heat of the moment he and many others failed to see what they must now see, that not the naturalized citizens were to be blamed for what had happened, but the native-born Locofocos who had imposed on them, and who impose on every body else equally that they can deceive. But time, reflection, and especially the bravery and patriotism with which he saw our naturalized soldiers fight through the Mexican war, convinced him that he had been wrong; and, as brave and honest men are the promptest to make amends, he made them to those to whom he had done injustice by a letter of 29th May, 1848, to Mr. W. E. Robinson.

THE MEXICAN WAR—SCOTT PLACED IN COMMAND.

We come now to that great and brilliant series of military operations; the daring, and it may well be styled romantic, expedition against the city of Mexico, which, by its bold conception and admirable execution, must place the name of WINFIELD SCOTT among the very first in modern warfare for consummate soldiership. The facts, however, are so recent, so fresh in the memory of many in all parts of our country who shared in them, that we shall have less need to relate them with any minuteness.

In the very outset of the war, the brave Gen. Taylor and his gallant army had won a succession of victories, which, while they gave great reputation to our arms, placed us in possession of the Mexican territories, on that side, as far as Tampico on the coast and Saltillo in the interior. Stockton and Fremont had seized upon Upper California, with little resistance; Kearny upon New Mexico with less; and Wool and Doniphan were marching unopposed over wide and worthless regions. But these acquisitions (the gold of California being yet undiscovered) promised us nothing but a terrible expense of troops to maintain them, as long as the war lasted; and as they had always been burdensome to Mexico, their loss was little likely to make her wish for peace. In short, our Government began to perceive that the war threatened to become a long and a ruinous one; for that it could only be finished by striking at the central seat of the Mexican power; and this there seemed no hope of reaching with any of our armies. It was in this state of things that Gen. Scott undertook to show them that there were resources in the art of war by which a great leader could penetrate to the very capital of our adversary, and from "the halls of Montezuma" dictate a peace. At first they looked on his whole idea as a mere dream; but it was not long before Scott made them see that it could be realized. They then adopted it and entrusted its execution to him: for they well knew that nobody else was capable of it. But, warned by the triumphs of Gen. Taylor, which had raised them up a rival for the Presidency, they determined, in employing Scott, to guard against any addition to his already dangerous renown, by setting over him a Democratic Lieutenant-General. This purpose, however, they took care to conceal until he was gone upon the expedition; and, happily, Congress refused to adopt the idea of the lieutenant-generalship. The latter, then, proceeded to the scene of operations; passing by way of the Rio Grande and Tampico to the isle of Lobos, where his troops were to be collected; and leaving his ordnance and other materials of war to follow him to Vera Cruz. There, by the 6th March, 1847, his whole fleet of transports arrived, and took station at Anton Lizardo, twelve miles south of the city. On the 7th, the General, accompanied by his chief officers and those of our squadron, examined the shore, in the little steamer Petrita, and fixed on a point about three miles south of the city for the landing.

HE LANDS NEAR VERA CRUZ—LAYS SIEGE TO IT, TAKES IT.

There have been few enterprises, for many centuries, like that of our great captain; none so daring, except that of Cortez. That of Lepanto, and that of the invincible Armada were failures. Bonaparte's against Egypt was far more numerous, and at last defeated. The French have been the teachers of war to the modern world; but their expedition against Algiers in 1830, while much larger, and of far longer preparation, was every way exceeded by Scott's. He surpassed his teachers. They, under much more favorable circumstances, threw ashore, in a day, but 9,000 men; he, 12,000. They lost, by accidents in the operation, near forty men; he, not one. Nothing was ever better managed. It was, indeed, so well done as to prevent all opposition by the enemy. He obtained the first great point—a foothold for conquest—without striking a blow. The second—the capture of Vera Cruz and its great castle—was accomplished with equal ability, almost without loss, in a surprisingly short time; and yet, with scarcely half the means of attack which the Government was to have sent him, he landed his troops on the 9th, invested the city at all points by the 12th: on the 18th, though delayed for five days by a storm which rendered impossible the landing of his siege guns, he opened his trenches; by the 22d he was ready to batter it, and sent it a formal notice to surrender; and by the 26th he had so torn it to pieces that it offered to capitulate, which it accordingly did next day; and on the 29th he took possession of the city, the castle, about five hundred pieces of fine artillery, a quantity of military stores, five thousand prisoners, and the chief commercial port of Mexico, the proper basis and point of supply for his further conquests. All this was, by a skill and a humanity alike admirable, effected with only the loss of two officers and but a dozen or two of men, while he was inflicting upon the enemy a terrible destruction.

HE PUSHES ON TOWARDS MEXICO—WINS THE GREAT VICTORY OF CERRO GORDO.

The highest qualities of the great commander are, caution to plan and rapidly to execute. For these Scott has always been remarkable. Giving the enemy no longer pause than was necessary for getting and putting in motion his own means for transporting his artillery and supplies, he moved forward with 8,000 men upon the enemy's formidable passes on the 8th of February. Meantime, while delayed, he had struck at and taken Alvarado, the next most important Mexican port in that quarter. His forward movement was in three divisions: the foremost that of Gen. Twiggs; Patterson's followed on the 10th; Worth's on the 12th. Of an opposing force of the enemy they had only vague accounts. On the 9th Scott had learned that Presinent Santa Anta was at Jalapa, with 6,000 men; but until he came in front of him at Cerro Gordo did not suppose his army above 4,000 strong.

But on the 14th, when he arrived at the little village of Rio del Plan, where lay Twiggs's division ready to attack and certain to have been defeated, he soon ascertained that the Mexican forces were before him, 15,000 strong, in what seemed an almost impregnable pass, the natural advantages of which, increased by many artificial defences, appeared to defy all direct attack, while a direct attack was thought the only one possible. So judged Santa Anna, no unskilful foe, and rested secure. But Scott soon undeceived him. Waiting for his rearmost division (that under Worth) to come up, he meantime looked into all the possibilities of his adversary's position, and found that a way (though narrow and rough) could be opened through the rocks and hills on the enemy's left, and that by this he might send a force into Santa Anna's rear, and at once carry his positions and cut off his retreat. Accordingly, Worth having joined him at midnight on the 16th, Scott made on the 17th all his dispositions for the morrow's attack, and issued that remarkable general order in which he may be said to have exactly described in advance the next day's battle. Already Twiggs's division (including Smith's brigade and supported by Shields's) had been pushed forward by the new path, and seized the Telegraph hill, in order to batter from it the enemy's chief position, the crest of Cerro Gordo. To mount our batteries on the Telegraph and another across the river on the enemy's right for raking their lower range of batteries (17 pieces) heavy guns were that night, with prodigious labor, dragged and lifted up by hand. Well, at dawn on the 18th, the movements begin. Twiggs advances upon the hill of Cerro Gordo; Shields is thrown still further forward, to take possession of the road beyond the pass, in the enemy's rear; Pillow's division attacks the lower range of batteries, rather with the view of alarming than of taking them; while Worth's division is held in reserve, with the dragoons and light artillery. On all sides the fight was fierce and long: but at last nothing could resist the American ardor: all the enemy's positions are stormed and carried: 3,000 of the enemy, including five generals, are cut off and surrender; the rest of their army is either killed or broken up and pursued; 43 fine pieces of bronze cannon, 5,000 stand of arms, all their military stores, 7 standards, and Santa Anna's military chest fell into our power; and while our total loss, in the two days of fighting, was but 431, in killed and wounded, the adverse force was annihilated, an indefinite number was destroyed, and the way to Mexico's capital left open; for really, in Scott's own words, "She had no longer an army."

CAPTURE OF JALAPA, PEROTE, AND PUEBLA.

The admirable battle of Cerro Gordo filled not only the American but the European world with astonishment, and gave a boundless idea of not only the valor of our troops but the military genius of their leader. It might well do so, for the victory was scarcely as brilliant as it was decisive. Puebla fell at once; the strongly fortified pass of La Hoya was abandoned; the powerful castle of Perote, one of the bulwarks of Mexico, surrendered, with all its cannon and stores; and the great town of Puebla, of which the wild and fertile valley was the destined granary and garden of temporary repose for our men, lay at our mercy. Of this last point possession was taken on the 15th of May. From it, with scarcely an intervening place of resistance, was within reach the grand final scene of Scott's operations—the great and beautiful vale of Mexico, its lakes, fortresses, castles, entrenched camps, and convents; those dangerous causeways, of whose difficulties Cortez got such a taste of old; and, lastly, the splendid old city itself. But Scott could not at once proceed to the attack; his effective force, cut down by battle, disease, desertion, the dismissal of volunteers whose term of service was running out, and the garrisons of necessity left behind, was now shrunk to less than five thousand. It would have been madness not to wait for reinforcements, as it would have been folly to carry forward to the desperate fights which he knew lay before him either unwilling volunteers, or, without a previous training, the fresh recruits that were to come up. Besides, like Gen. Taylor, he had served his country too well. Him he had been sent to eclipse; but he had eclipsed him too much, and turned upon himself the Presidential and party jealousy, which had little thought of making a war that should give glory and popularity to its Generals, not itself, and raise them, not itself or its friends, to two successive Presidencies. To guard against this, it had intended to place over Scott a party Lieutenant-General; and, failing in that, it had now sent, in the person of a clerk out of the State Department, (Mr. Trist,) a civil commissioner, empowered to stop the operations of the army just when he saw fit. Under these strange and disheartening circumstances, Scott was compelled to pause during the month of June and July. He was even without money to buy ordinary supplies for his troops. Meantime several important measures occupied him and turned the delay to a good; he issued a very able proclamation to the Mexicans, to conciliate them; he made himself far better acquainted with the difficulties and defences of the great vale; he thoroughly disciplined the raw troops, as fast as they arrived; and, seeing that he had not force enough without it, he boldly abandoned his line of communications with Vera Cruz, brought forward all his garrisons, and turned his army, as he said, into a "self-sustaining machine." On the 7th August he sent forward his first division for the Mexican vale. The others followed on the 8th, 9th, and 10th. From that day to the 13th they all entered the plain.

TURNS LAKE CHALCO: VICTORY AFTER VICTORY: TAKES THE GREAT CITY.

The direct approach to the capital by the national road offered the greatest difficulties, natural and artificial, of any. Quitting it, therefore, outside the range of these more formidable defences, which would have cost the lives of too many of his brave and beloved soldiers, he retraced his steps from El Penon, (near to which he advanced,) repassed Ayotla, and from Buenavista made his way, through many difficulties, around Lakes Chalco and Xochomilco, to San Augustin, on the more assailable but still very strong southern side of the city. This unexpected manœuvre and march began on the 15th and was accomplished by the 18th of August. It avoided the main preparations of the enemy; struck at his weakest point; brought our army within nine instead of fifteen miles of the city, and gave us a better field of action. Here, at once, Scott began, with a total force of less than 11,000 men, to let loose, in a series of admirably calculated battles and manœuvres, the whole art of war, in assailing and beating, amidst all their advantages of fortified positions, an enemy of about thrice his numbers. First of all came the strongly defended village of San Antonio, approachable only by a long causeway. It Scott turned on the 19th, by cutting a way through a field of lava, (a pedregal); fell on the fortified camp of Valencia in its rear, and in the battle of Contreras, on the 20th, cut to pieces his 7,000 men and made 2,000 prisoners, in sight of Santa Anna's force of 12,000. Upon this, the position of San Antonio fell at once and was evacuated, making the second point carried that morning. In the afternoon the three several battles of Churubusco—those of the *Tête du pont*, (bridge-head,) of the Castle-Convent of San Pablo, and of the plain of Churubusco, against Santa Anna in person—were fought and won, with a destruction of near one-half of the entire Mexican army and of all their outer range of defences. Nothing was left them but the Castle of Chapultepec, the Molino del Rey, and the fortified city-gates, to protect the capital. Their loss in men was thus far at least 12,000; ours, rather more than 1,000. The city could probably, in the terror and confusion of such dreadful defeats, have been taken by storm that night. So thought Scott; but the Government had placed with him a commissioner, and duty not less than humanity (the two ever his great leading-stars) commanded that he should listen to overtures. These came the next morning, and he consented to an armistice, for Mr. Trist to try the virtue of negotiation. It failed, however, on the 6th. On the 7th, Scott put an end to the armistice, and